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    Fred. D. Miller, Aristotle and the Natural rights tradition

    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Johnathan R. Razorback
    Admin


    Messages : 19284
    Date d'inscription : 12/08/2013
    Localisation : France

    Fred. D. Miller, Aristotle and the Natural rights tradition Empty Fred. D. Miller, Aristotle and the Natural rights tradition

    Message par Johnathan R. Razorback Jeu 18 Aoû - 11:40

    https://www.wikiberal.org/wiki/Fred_D._Miller

    https://reasonpapers.com/pdf/13/rp_13_14.pdf

    "I contend, against many interpreters [comme Alasdair MacIntyre et Leo Strauss], that not only is  Aristotle a proponent of natural rights, but that they play an important role in his political theory. The argument of this paper complements the arguments in some other recent works that Aristotle's teleological view of human nature and his ethical theory of eudaimonia (happiness or flourishing) can serve as a foundation for a theory of individual rights akin to Locke's." (p.1)

    "Locke derives a more robust set of natural rights than Hobbes, which entail interpersonal obligations to respect the exercise of these rights, but this derivation relies upon an undefended theistic assumption: that human beings are the creatures and property of a divine craftsman, who has assigned to them duties, which are the source of their claim-rights and interpersonal obligations." (p.5)

    "Aristotle recognizes that there are many areas in which the particular character of justice must be determined by means of agreement among those who establish the laws. To this extent, he would agree with contractarian theorists who argue that where parties have no objective basis for arriving at a rational decision, they must reach a decision by means of mutual agreement. Nevertheless, Aristotle criticizes the claim that political justice is merely conventional, and he concludes his discussion with the important claim that only one constitution is according to nature the best everywhere. This clearly implies that he regards natural justice as a standard by which different constitutions can be evaluated and compared on a normative scale as better or worse.
    Aristotle distinguishes different specific form of justice, each of which has political applications. Distributive justice or proportionate equality is explicitly connected with the evaluation of different constitutions as ways of distributing  political authority. Corrective justice is a way of restoring deviations from just distributions which have resulted from involuntary transfers and is applied in the judicial part of the constitution. And commutative justice or proportionate reciprocity, which governs voluntary exchanges among members of a community, is said to preserve the
    polis." (p.6)

    "According to Aristotle's principle of distributive justice, more meritorious persons should receive greater rewards, in proportion to their greater merit. For example, if x contributes twice as much to a business venture as y, then x should receive twice as much of the profits." (p.6)

    "It is noteworthy (though no often noted), that Aristotle here recognizes that unjust rule involves coercion, because naturally free people are unwilling to have their rights violated. A constitution conforms to natural justice only if it is voluntary and has "the consent of the governed."." (p.172-173)

    "The Aristotelian derivation of natural rights differs from that of both Hobbes and Locke in that it is ultimately grounded in his teleological view of human nature. According to Aristotle, a teleological explanation includes the final cause, "the end or that for the sake of which a thing is done," e.g. when a person takes a walk for the sake of health. Aristotle uses such explanations throughout his natural treatises, especially, the biological works, to understand sexual reproduction, presence and structure of various organs, and specific physical and psychological processes within organisms like breathing, sleeping, hearing, and thinking. His ethical and political writings draw upon his teleological view of human nature at various crucial places. For  example, his well-known analysis of flourishing or happiness, the ultimate end of human action, turns on the claim that a human being, in contrast to other species of life, has a special function. The Politics defines happiness as "the actualization and complete practice of virtue". This closely parallels the definition of the Eudemian Ethic: "the actualization of a complete life expressing complete virtue"." (p.8 )

    "The theory of natural human ends is also presupposed in his argument that human beings are political animals: nature makes nothing in vain, and human beings are the only animals endowed by nature with logos (speech or reason). Human speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust ; and the partnership or community in these things makes a household and city. Aristotle further argues that because human beings cannot realize their natural ends apart from the polis, the legislator is the greatest of benefactors." (p.9)

    "Aristotle is arguing here that the polis is needed in order for individual human beings to attain their natural ends of life and happiness. And in order to realize their natural ends, the polis must be arranged or organized in accordance with justice or the common advantage. [...] Justice or the common advantage is the principle which recognizes the claim of each of the members of the polis to realize their natural ends as far as they are able. Hence, "the common advantage" for Aristotle refers to the mutual advantage of each individual, rather than the overall or general advantage, a la utilitarianism."(p.174-175)

    "The Aristotelian derivation of natural rights differs from the natural rights theories of Hobbes and Locke not only in presupposing a teleological theory of natural ends, but also in proceeding from the premise that human beings are political animals, in the sense that they require a specific social context in order to realize their natural ends. Hobbes objects to this premise, appealing to his observations of human behavior: human beings are continually in competition for honor and dignity ; they distinguish between their own good and the common good and naturally seek the former ; they use their reason to question the existing order ; they use their voice to misrepresent good and evil ; and when they are at their ease, they use their wisdom to try to overthrow legal authorities. Aristotle is not ignorant of such facts ; indeed, he calls attention to them frequently in Politics IV-W. But he does not see them as undermining his claim that human beings are social animals. Hobbes, in contrast, regards these facts as refuting Aristotle's claim, because he conjoins them with other philosophical theses: the thesis of value subjectivism, that good and evil are the objects of our subjective desires and aversions ; the thesis of narrow psychological egoism and the thesis, shared with Hume, that reason is not a primary motivating force, but merely an instrument or "slave of the passions." Aristotle rejects all of these theses. He maintains the thesis of value objectivism, that good and evil are defined with reference to our natural ends, specifically, the activity of higher human capacities. These capacities are discoverable by means of rational inquiry and may not be the object of a person's strongest desires. And although Aristotle holds that people have a natural desire of self-love, he also argues that human beings can fully realize their natural ends only in a social context based upon justice, virtue, and friendship. And he believes that reason by
    identifying the means to human natural ends can motivate human beings to act accordingly
    ." (p.175-176)

    "Although Aristotle criticizes the more extreme features of Plato's political ideal, such as communism and the dissolution of the family, his own political theory contains a number of authoritarian features in comparison with modern liberalism. Nevertheless, Aristotle's undeniable illiberal tendencies are due not to a denial of natural rights, but to other parts of his political theory. Three of the most important differences, as I shall now argue, concern his view of equality, of freedom and liberty, and of the relation of the individual to the polis." (p.176-177)

    "A conspicuous point of difference from modern liberalism is his explicit rejection of the claim all human beings have equal rights by nature. Thus, Aristotle defends the institution of slavery on the grounds that some persons are natural slaves. He argues that the master-slave relation exemplifies a natura relation of ruler and ruled. Hence, natural slaves may be justly treated as property of naturally free persons. Similarly, he contends that "the relation of male to female is by nature a relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled". Hence, although women are nominally citizens, they should not have the rights to political participation which Aristotle takes to be definitive of citizen." (p.177)

    "Aristotle agrees that slavery would be unjust if it rested on force rather than on a difference in nature. Such a criticism is sometimes justified, for example, when Greeks are enslaved by other Greeks. But he argues that slavery is not unjust or contrary to nature when it involves a natural slave, who "participates in reason only to the extent of perceiving it, but does not have it". Lacking the rational faculty, specifically, calculation and deliberation, the slave is naturally dependent upon others for guidance. Because of this natural dependence, Aristotle claims that slavery is a mutually advantageous
    relationship: it benefits the slave as well as the master. Similar claims are advanced regarding the dependence of women and children: "The slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element ; the female has it but it lacks authority ; the child has it but it is incomplete".
    " (p.177)

    "A second point of difference between Aristotle and modern liberals concerns their emphasis upon freedom or liberty. Aristotle does not altogether disvalue freedom or liberty, for he reckons them as external goods needed for the exercise of moral virtue and, hence, for attaining the good life. Further, political justice presupposes that the parties are free and equal persons. Also, as noted in section 3, Aristotle thinks it a mark of the correct constitution that the citizens give their consent to the rulers. Nevertheless, Aristotle is a trimmer on the subject of liberty. He tends to regard it as only an external good and not as essential to the good life. Here he seems to have been influenced by Socrates' arguments that freedom and liberty, like other external goods, can be possessed in excess, which can both impede the good life and jeopardize the constitution. "Freedom" was a catchword for Creek democrats, who, Aristotle says, defined it as "living as one wants". (It should be noted that these democrats did not add the limitation "so long as one does not trespass upon the equal fights of others."). Aristotle objects against this conception of freedom on the grounds that it is inimical to a life of moral virtue and leads to the violation of the rights of others, e.g. to the confiscation of the property of the wealthy by the democratic majority."
    (p.178)

    "When Aristotle makes the stronger claims that the polis exists by nature and that the polis is prior to the individual, he is advancing positions which are fundamentally at odds with liberalism. For these doctrines imply that the polis is a natural entity rather than a human artifact, and that the individual is morally subordinate to the polis, Aristotle seems to accept such implications when he argues in support of a public system of education. Aristotle thinks that the priority principle justifies the ruler in using coercion against the members of the polis, for example, to habituate them to become morally virtuous. This is to be sure an illiberal inference." (p.179)

    -Fred. D. Miller, "Aristotle and the Natural rights tradition", Reason Papers, No. 13 (Spring 1988), 166-18.



    _________________
    « La question n’est pas de constater que les gens vivent plus ou moins pauvrement, mais toujours d’une manière qui leur échappe. » -Guy Debord, Critique de la séparation (1961).

    « Rien de grand ne s’est jamais accompli dans le monde sans passion. » -Hegel, La Raison dans l'Histoire.

    « Mais parfois le plus clair regard aime aussi l’ombre. » -Friedrich Hölderlin, "Pain et Vin".


      La date/heure actuelle est Ven 29 Mar - 0:32